The Purpose of Death - Part 5 - The Problem of Evil and Free Will

By tackling the problem of evil – we have somewhat strayed from our original intent of discussing the age of the earth. However, since CAT has taken us down this path, we are simply following their lead.

The first approach to the problem of evil focuses on the libertarian free will of man. It is an approach that would be characterized as Arminian [1] in its outlook. Hank Hanegraaff (the Bible Answer Man) uses this approach along with many other evidential apologists, as well as the authors of CAT. The key is a dual appeal to 1) the original creation being different than today, and 2) appealing to the notion that God created with the potentiality of evil – and that man actualized that evil by his free will choice – not God.

They [non-Christians and/or PC] fail to see that God created a perfect world, a world free from death. (CAT-19)

Essentially, this boils down to a perfect paradise until the Fall. Then death, disease, carnivorous activity and every other spiritual and natural evil entered into creation.

There is some merit to this approach. YEC and OEC agree that the Fall had an impact on creation. We do not agree that animal death was a result of the fall, but we agree that the introduction of sin into humanity had negative consequences to nature, animals, and the environment. This would primarily be based on the effects of sinful humans on their surroundings.

This approach further narrows in on the Fall and in particular the libertarian free will of man. It should be noted that CAT does not mention free will in its discussion since it is focused mainly on the purpose of death. However, we must address this since it’s an integral part of this approach to the problem of evil.

The approach claims that God created Adam with a potential for evil. It was Adam (and Eve) that actualized that evil and brought about the devastating consequences from the fall. Free will actions of men continue to this day and this is the cause of evil in our world today. This argument is best exemplified by Greg Koukl in this article Stand to Reason Sixty Second Theodicy [2].

Here is the essential quote from the article answering how could a good God and a powerful God allow evil in the world?

First point: "Would you like to see laws prohibiting a person from choosing an abortion?" Keep in mind that I am presuming that I'm speaking to a non-Christian who is fairly liberal and this is the last thing they want. If they happen to be pro-life, I could change the question to "Would you like to see laws passed prohibiting premarital sex?" Or "prohibiting homosexual behavior?" Now I suspect that when I ask them if they want to have laws passed on any of those things, they would say "no". My question, "Why?" And their answer is going to be, "Because I think people ought to be allowed to choose." Now there's the key. If you ask a question that beckons the response that people ought to be allowed to choose between moral alternatives, that's the whole key.

Second point: "So, it's a good thing that you have freedom to make moral choices, is that right?" "Yes, of course."

Third point: "Would it be fair to say that it's part of the nature of moral freedom to be possible to choose either good or evil? In other words, how can you say you are morally free if you can only choose good? You say it's a good thing to have moral choices and that entails that one can choose either good or evil, correct?" "Yes."

Last point: "Can raw power make it possible to have genuine moral freedom, but no possibility of doing evil?" The answer there is "No." Having genuine moral freedom entails the notion that you might choose evil, as we just said. And being strong can't change that. You can have all the power in the entire universe and you can't create a being who has moral freedom and at the same time has only one thing he can choose: good things, not bad things. Moral freedom requires that a person be capable of choosing evil and having moral freedom is a good thing.

That was the fourth question and here's how it comes together. Moral freedom requires that we can freely choose either good or evil; therefore, the possibility of choosing evil is a good thing, because moral freedom is a good thing. The fact that evil is possible is a good thing. Do you see that? Evil isn't good; but the fact that it's possible is a good thing because it means that you have genuine moral freedom.

Let's get back to our original question. A good God would want to remove the possibility of evil. False. Based on our little discussion we just had, a really good God
would make evil possible…. What about the second point? If He was powerful enough, He would get rid of evil. But how does having more power allow God to have a world of true moral choices where the only choice is to do good? Do you see that is contradictory? [2]

Here we see the first approach to theodicy – by appeal to free will. Some theologians, like Hank Hanegraaff narrow the focus more to something called libertarian free will. Libertarian free will is defined as:

Freedom as understood in the libertarian sense means that a person is fully able to perform some other action in place of the one that is actually done, and this is not predetermined by any prior circumstances, our desires or even our affections. In other words, our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature. All free will theists hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called our decision or free choice. Libertarian freedom is, in fact, the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires. [3]

The free will theodicy accounts for evil in our world from Adam until the present. The approach is biblically based and it tries to honor God. It is not a heretical view and neither is Arminianism. However, it does not really answer the problem. You see this really only redirects the question a little. It deflects the question from God to man - but it does not account for God's purpose in evil (if there is one) Be prepared for a come back which would go something like this:

OK, fine, but if God made things the way he did, and he knew that man would choose to reject him causing all this evil and suffering, and yet he created things like this anyway – then you still have not answered the problem – if God could have avoided evil but didn’t then why call him God. [4]

If you are an open-theist then your answer is that God didn’t know exactly what would happen. Open Theism asserts that God does not exhaustively know the future and He is in the process of learning [5]. Orthodox Christianity rejects open-theism as heresy.

Gary Crampton summarizes this point well:

Arminianism... fails to give us a solution. Arminian theologians attribute the origin of evil to the free will of man, rather than the will of God, positing a dualism of sorts. In his freedom, Adam chose to sin, apart from God's sovereign will. Adam had a "liberty of indifference" to the will of God. God "merely permitted" man to sin. The idea, however, of God's "permitting" man to sin does not solve the problem. Clark explained: "Somehow the idea of God¹s permitting evil without decreeing it seems to absolve God from the charge that He is the author of sin, but one must be careful, both with respect to the logic of the argument and to the full Scriptural data. God permitted Satan to afflict Job; but since Satan could not have done so without God's approval, the idea of permission hardly exonerates God. Is perfect holiness any more compatible with approving or permitting Satanic evil? If God could have prevented, not only Job's trials, but all the other sins and temptations to which mankind is subject—if He foresaw them and decided to let them occur--is He less reprehensible [on this view] than if He positively decreed them? If a man could save a baby from a burning house, but decided to permit the baby to burn, who would dare say that he was morally perfect in so deciding?"[6]

I (TODDL) do not agree with the concept of a libertarian free will theodicy. We will spend the next installment looking into the Calvinist solution that God is the first cause of all things and the He ordains everything that comes to pass – even evil – for the purpose of the fullness of His glory.

Notes:
[1] By claiming this approach is Arminian, we are not suggesting that this rules out the fact that there are YEC and OEC in both Calvinist and Arminian camps. In general the answer to the question of evil stems from your outlook on God’s sovereignty and man’s freedom – which is one of the major disagreements in the Calvinist vs. Arminian debate.

[2] http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5629&printer_friendly=1
(accessed 7/6/2007)

[3] Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will. by John Hendryx
http://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/libertarian.html
(accessed 7/7/2007)

[4] the atheist rebel would not capitalize pronouns directed to God – so I did not do so in this quote of a hypothetical atheistic objector.

[5] An in-depth look at free will and open theism can be found at the CARM website (Matt Slick) Open Theism and Libertarian Free Will.
http://www.carm.org/open/free_will.htm (accessed 7/9/2007)

[6] W. Gary Crampton in A Biblical Theodicy - http://www.leaderu.com/theology/theodicy.html (accessed 7/9/2007)
quoting Gordon H. Clark, First Corinthians (The Trinity Foundation, 1975, 1991), 156-157